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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. Case No. 920170-CA 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant David R. Williams ("Williams") hereby 
respectfully submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of Appellee, 
Petersen Electric, Inc. ("Petersen") as follows: 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the Brief of Appellee, Petersen attempts to cast 
Williams1 Arguments as assertions that Williams is disputing the 
lower court's Findings of Fact. In order that there be no 
misunderstanding, Williams believes that for purposes of the 
arguments contained in his briefs, he can accept all the Findings 
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of Fact of the lower court which are indeed Findings of Fact. 
Williams believes his arguments rest solely on errors of lav/ 
contained in the judgment of the lower court. 
To the extent this Court determines it is necessary to 
reach a finding of fact, then Williams challenges the findings of 
fact to be contrary to the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
WILLIAMS DOES NOT CHALLENGE ANY LOWER COURT 
FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT ONLY CONTENDS THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE MISAPPLIED TO THE 
FACTS. 
Petersen has wrongly attempted to characterize certain 
legal conclusions as Findings of Fact. In addition, Petersen has 
misrepresented that the lower court's findings contain a finding 
determining the intention of the parties (and therefore determining 
a contract provision or a course of practice between the parties) 
about when the bills or invoices were due. The lower court made no 
such finding, nor could it. 
A. The lower court determination of when the statute of 
limitations begins to run is a conclusion of law. 
Even though the lower court found that the bills 
(invoices) were calculated on a "time and materials" basis and 
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accepted the billings (Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16) into 
evidence, the lower court did not find or conclude, nor could it, 
that such billings are a part of the contract between the parties. 
The conclusion of the lower court that the payment was not "due and 
payable until the 10th of the month following billing," is not 
properly a finding of fact, but a conclusion of law based upon the 
billing statement prepared by Peterson, never agreed to by 
Williams, and never found by the lower court to be a part of the 
contract between the parties. 
As discussed in Williams' opening brief, because the 
bills or invoices cannot be a part of the contract between the 
parties, as a matter of law, the language of the invoice which 
allows payment by the 10th of the following month is certainly not 
a part of the contract, not binding upon Williams, and does not 
determine the running of the Statute of Limitations. 
Appellee first contends that Judge Hanson found the 
parties intended that payment was not due until the 10th of the 
following month and Petersen erroneously refers to Finding of Fact 
No. 10 as contained in an earlier version. (See Brief of Appellee, 
Page 10). The correct finding is No. 9 as submitted in the latest 
version of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 349). 
Neither Finding No. 9 or No. 10 contain a finding about the 
intention of the parties nor do they mention or determine a 
3 
contract provision. 
Judge Hanson made no such finding. The lower court made 
no finding of fact at all about the intentions of either party 
concerning when the payments were due. Not one of the bills, 
statements or invoices which are in question were signed by 
Williams or found to be part of any contract. See copies of the 
Memorandum Decision attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached hereto as Exhibit 2. In 
addition, there is no testimony or evidence in the record which 
supports the argument that the bills or the payment due* provision 
became a part of the contract. 
Also contrary to Petersen's assertion, Williaims usually 
did obtain a quote or estimate from Petersen on the expected amount 
that would be due for the work and materials. See R. 466, lines 
18-20, R. 524, lines 20-24, R. 526, lines 17-25 and R. 547, lines 
17-25. 
Petersen next contends that Williams was "not in breach" 
until after the billing was sent and through the 10th of the 
following month and that Petersen's billing was a "condition 
precedent" before Williams could breach the agreement. (Brief of 
Appellee, Page 13) This Argument only begs the issue of what the 
contract of the parties was. The contract between the parties did 
not provide when payment was due nor for conditions precedent and, 
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therefore, by implication, inference and contract law, payment was 
due upon delivery or completion of the work (See Appellant's Brief 
Pg. 7-9). Petersen could have presented a bill the day each job 
was complete and required payment, but did not. William's non-
payment or refusal to pay at any time after completion was a breach 
of the agreement. 
William's defense was not, as next asserted by Petersen, 
that he required a bill before being legally obligated to pay. On 
the contrary, Williams defense was that such a long a time had 
elapsed without a bill and Petersen's records were so poor, that by 
the time a bill was sent, neither Petersen nor Williams could 
remember or determine the fairness or accuracy of the billings. (R. 
524, lines 6-10). 
Next, Petersen contends that the twenty year course of 
dealing or practice between the parties was evidence that the 
billings were in fact due and payable on the 10th day of the 
following month, but Petersen fails to also point out that during 
the twenty year period, Mr. Williams had only made his payments in 
trade. There was no course of conduct or practice which occurred 
or existed regarding when the bills were due or actually paid. 
Because of the disputes which arose over the bills, the parties had 
never agreed about when payment was to be made. 
On Page 16 of its Brief, Petersen argues that William 
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Feinstein Brothers, Inc. v. L.Z. Hotte Granite, Co,, 184 A.2d 540 
(Vermont 1962) stands for the proposition that the issue of when 
payment was due is a question of fact and not of law. Petersen's 
analysis falls short of thoroughly examining the issues of this 
case. It is true that the question of when payment is due is a 
question of fact when the contract of the parties or conduct of the 
parties (which is binding on both) deals with or determines when 
payment is due. The Court then properly "finds" what the contract 
provides about the due date. If, however, the contract does not 
provide for a date payment is due and the conduct of the parties, 
does not specify a date for payment, then the law provides, as a 
conclusion of law, that payment is due upon completion of the 
contract. (See Brief of Appellant at Pages 7-9). 
Williams expectations about the bills are not a part of 
the contract. Williams expected a bill because he was very 
concerned about the accuracy of the bills, to verify the exact 
amount for payment, and to know how the amount was calculated from 
the itemization of work, labor and materials. (R. 555, lines 2-
18) . 
The contract between Williams and Petersen is not a 
credit sale. There is no testimony or evidence in the record 
below, no finding or conclusion, that demonstrates a contract for 
credit sale existed, that credit was approved, that Williams agreed 
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to any sort of interest rate or payment terms as to amount, 
periodic payment or any other like term normally associated with 
credit sales. 
In this case, the law requires payment be due upon 
completion or delivery and the statute began to run immediately. 
Therefore, all work completed prior to October 3, 1985, four years 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit required that Plaintiff's 
action be filed before such dates and cannot now be collected 
because of the four year statute of limitations. 
To the extent the lower court found that a contract 
provision existed for payment to be due only from the 10th of the 
following month after billing, Williams challenges such finding as 
contrary to the evidence. 
B. Williams1 agent had apparent authority to purchase 
material from Petersen, as found by the lower court, 
but could not lawfully vary the terms of the original 
Agreement• 
In it's Brief, Petersen erroneously asserts that Williams 
is requesting this Court to overturn the Finding of Fact of the 
lower court that William's agent, Don Lloyd, had apparent authority 
to purchase the new generator. See Finding of Fact No. 7 at R. 
348. 
Williams, in its brief, (Pages 12-20) does not contend 
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that the lower court finding that Lloyd had apparent authority is 
incorrect, but only that under the facts and law of this case, 
Lloyd had no authority to vary the terms of the original agreement 
between Petersen and Williams. In other words, the lower court is 
mistaken on the law in concluding that Lloyd had authority to 
purchase a new generator for Williams when such had the effect of 
modifying a previous agreement of his principal with the same 
party. 
The original agreement between Petersen and Williams in 
regard to the generator is found in the testimony of both Petersen 
and Williams: 
Petersen testified at trial as follows: 
Q. I would like to know what your memory is of the 
conversation. 
A. David said, Go ahead and rebuild the old generator. 
Q. Is that your memory of the conversation with Mr. 
Williams? 
A. Yes. That was prior to us finding out when the 
armature was burnt. 
Q. He said to go ahead and repair the old generator? 
A. Rebuild the old generator. 
Q. Do you remember if you quoted him a price in that 
conversation? 
A. Yes, I know I did. 
R. at 466, lines 9-20. 
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At trial David Williams testified as follows: 
Q. Will you relate what the substance and effect of that 
conversation was? 
A. Mr. Petersen told me that he felt that it was going 
to cost between $800.00 and $900.00 to repair my generator. 
I told him, okay, go ahead and repair the generator that I 
needed the generator fixed. So he said, all right, he would 
go ahead and get started on it. 
Q. Did he relate to you what he was going to do to 
repair it? 
A. Well, he told me he was going to tear — he was in 
the process of tearing the generator down, and that, in 
looking at what needed to be done, that it was going to cost 
around $800.00 to $900.00 to fix. Did I want to go ahead and 
have it fixed? And I told him, yes, I did. 
Q. Anything else about that conversation? 
A. No, that!s pretty well all that was said, other than 
he told me he would get right on it and get it out to us. 
Record at 531, lines 1-17. 
Thus there was a clear understanding between Petersen and 
Williams himself on the rebuilding of the old generator and even 
though the agent Lloyd had authority to purchase from Petersen as 
found by the lower court, Lloyd could not vary the terms of an 
existing agreement. See Brief of Appellant at pages 15-20. 
The purchase of a new generator would be a modification 
of the original agreement with Williams to rebuild the old 
generator. Mac Petersen knew that to rebuild a generator was a 
completely different proposition from purchasing a new one. Mac 
Petersen insisted on the term "rebuild" in his testimony in 
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response to questioning about the original conversation (R. 466). 
Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam Webster, Inc., 
Page 982 (1991) defines "rebuild" as follows: "to make extensive 
repairs" and "to reconstruct". Petersen was completely aware of 
the original agreement. 
Mac Petersen knew that only one generator was needed by 
Williams or why else would he attempt to falsify an invoice to show 
a rebuilt generator and misrepresent the fact so Williams would not 
know he was receiving a new generator. 
The lower court reviewed the falsification of the invoice 
for the generator as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. Do you have the original documents on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 3? That's the one that had to do with the 
transformer or transmitter. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can I see those, please? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am still a little confused on this generator, where* 
you used the new generator and sent out the new billing. 
That's Exhibit No. 15. I believe your testimony was that you 
prepared an original invoice that showed a new generator. 
That was the second page of your Exhibit No. 15. Do you have 
that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then based upon the request, as indicated on the top 
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of the paper here, Don asked you to rewrite the invoice. 
A. To make it look like we did rebuild the old one. 
Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you understand that was important for the purpose 
of Mr. Lloyd showing that to Mr. Williams, so that Mr. 
Williams would think the generator was rebuilt, rather than 
buying a new one? Is that what the purpose of this, of Mr. 
Lloyd represented to you as to why he wanted this redone? 
A. To save Don's skin, yes, sir. 
Q. It was to save Don's skin with his boss? 
A. Right. At his request, I did this. 
Q. Obviously, at that point in time you understood that 
at least in that particular instant Don Lloyd was not working 
in the best interest of Mr. Williams, if he was going to trick 
him? 
A. As I stated, I believe he made a decision that was 
in the best interest for Mr. Williams. 
Q. I understand all that. I don't have any problem 
with that. What I want to know is, at this point in time, 
where this invoice was redone, to show it was a repaired 
generator, as opposed to a new one, that was done by a person 
who was an employee of Mr. Williams, but you knew at that 
point in time the employee was requesting that change so he 
could represent something that was not true to Mr. Williams; 
is that right? 
A. So Mr. Williams wouldn't think that he made the 
decision to buy a new one, and overrode Dave's decision. 
That's what I would have to assume, yes, sir. 
Q. Have you ever done that in any other circumstance, 
where an employee has asked you to change an invoice, so that 
the boss won't know what you really got? 
A. Never, no, sir. 
481-83). 
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Thus Petersen knew of the original agreement and let 
Lloyd stumble into a trap in asking for the new generator• 
It is irrelevant to the issue of contract law, as is 
advanced by Petersen, what the "economic sense or advisability" or 
value of the original contract was to Williams. Parties are held 
to their contracts not based upon a determination of "economic 
sense or advisability", but on the theories of consideration, a 
meeting of the minds, and mutuality. Williams agreed to pay for a 
repaired generator and Petersen agreed to repair the same. (R. 466 
and 531). The price changed as new difficulties were discovered 
with the repair of the generator, but no evidence was presented to 
the Court nor found by it to demonstrate Williams had ever agreed 
to other than the repair of the old generator. 
Under the circumstances of this case, it is incumbent 
upon third parties who deal with principals and agents to determine 
if indeed the* principal is agreeable to a change in the terms of 
the contract, which Petersen failed to do. (See Brief of 
Appellant, Pages 12-20). 
Petersen is not an innocent third party because (1) 
Petersen was aware of the terms of the original agreement and did 
not determine for itself whether Williams had agreed to a change in 
such terms and (2) Petersen conspired with the agent to alter and 
misrepresent a sale of the new generator to Williams. (R. 476, 
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lines 10-17 and R. 481-83). 
Therefore, Williams should not be bound to the agreement 
entered into by the agent to purchase the new generator. 
Should this court determine that the lower court's 
finding (that the agent Lloyd had authority to purchase the new 
generator) is correct and controlling, then Williams challenges 
such finding on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence 
presented below. As stated above, Petersen had knowledge through 
its agents of the original agreement to repair the generator and 
the falsification of the invoice misrepresented the facts to 
Williams. Under such circumstances the agent Lloyd could not have 
had authority to bind the Principal. See Appellants Brief Pages 
15-20. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Williams does not seek to overturn the 
lower court Findings of Fact. The determination by the lower court 
that the bills were due from a certain day is in actuality a 
conclusion of law which the lower court erroneously applied to the 
facts of this case. The finding that the agent, Don Lloyd had 
apparent authority to act for Williams does not give Lloyd the 
legal authority to alter the terms of the previous agreement, which 
under law as an agent he could not do. 
To the extent this Court determines the Findings of Fact 
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in either issue (a contract provision controlling when payments 
were due and what authority the agent Lloyd possessed) determine 
the result in this case, then Williams challenges such findings as 
contrary to the evidence presented below. 
The lower court decision should be reversed and Williams 
should only be found to be indebted to Petersen in that amount 
equal to work performed within the four year statute of limitation. 
DATED this ^^ ^aay of October, 1992. 
SNOW, HUTCHISON & NEIDER 
x^-—=— 
MICHAEL A. NEIDER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^^ day of October, 1992, 
I mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of the foregoing Reply 
Brief, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gregory M. Simonsen 
175 South Main St., #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC, INC., 
riaintlli, 
vs, 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS, dba 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
INC., and GENERAL BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION, dba KFAM RADIO, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. S90906019 CV 
The above-referenced matter came before the Court for 
trial, and concluded on the 29 th day of January, 1991. 
Following closing of the evidence and both sides resting, the 
Court requested counsel to submit their closing arguments in 
writing. Counsel submitted their closing arguments in 
accordance with the Court's request, and the Court has now had 
an opportunity to review its notes regarding the evidentiary 
matters received during the course of trial, review carefully 
the exhibits offered, and finally, review carefully closing 
arguments of counsel on the issues presented during the course 
of trial. The Courr being fully advised, then enters the 
following Memorandum Decision. 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The ccise before the Court is primarily a claim by the 
plaintiff against the defendant for electrical goods and 
services supplied to the defendants over a substantial period 
of time. The defendant resists the claim asserted by the 
plaintiff on a number of grounds, including claims that he is 
entitled to certain setoffs, that the billings were untimely, 
and that the claims asserted are barred by the statute of 
limitations. Further, the defendant alleges that the amounts 
billed are excessive, both in the amount of time expended and 
the hourly rate charged. Finally, the def€»ndant asserts that 
there was no agreement to perform work in certain instances for 
which the plaintiff seeks payment. 
As to the claims of the plaintiff in general as to the 
amount of work performed and the amount charged, the Court 
finds that the best evidence supports the factual finding and 
the conclusions as suggested by the plaintiff that the work was 
performed on a time and materials basis, as opposed to a firm 
quote as suggested by the defendant. The Court rejects the 
defendant's argument that the estimates for the various work 
constituted firm price commitments and quotations which would 
bind the plaintiff. The Court finds that the defendant's 
evidence on this issue is inconsistent and nonpersuasive. 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Turning to the issue regarding the time charged and the 
amount charged for that time by the plaintiff for the work 
performed on the defendant's various projects, the Court finds 
that the plaintiff's evidence on those issues shows that for 
the work done, the time expended was reasonable and necessary 
to perform the requested work, and that the work was performed 
in conformity with the standards of practice for similar work 
in this community. Further, the Court is satisfied that the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the finding, and the Court 
does find that the hourly rate charged by the plaintiff and the 
cost charges attributable to these jobs are appropriate and in 
an amount which reflect a fair and reasonable charge for the 
work accomplished. 
On the issue of the generator, the Court finds that the 
plaintiff supplied a new generator to the defendant at the 
request of defendant's agent. While the defendant disputes 
that his agent had the authority to order a new generator, 
there is no believable evidence that would suggest that the 
plaintiff had been made aware of the defendant's directions to 
his agent at the time the order for the new generator was 
placed. Defendant's agent, when the order was placed for the 
new generator rather than a rebuilt generator, had apparent 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
authority to act on behalf of his principal, the defendant, and 
the testimony shows that the ordering of a new generator was in 
any event economically advisable when done. Accordingly, if 
the defendant has problems with the commitments made to third 
parties, including the plaintiff, by the defendant's agent, the 
defendant should look to his agent in that regard• 
Turning to the issue regarding the Ensign Peak job, the 
Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has met its burden of 
proof on that issue, and that the plaintiff and the defendant, 
once again through defendant's agent, agreed that the plaintiff 
would perform the work that was ultimately performed at that 
project site. Accordingly, the issues regarding the Ensign 
Peak job are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the evidence 
presented by the plaintiff being the most believable and 
logical under the circumstances. 
The defendant claims he is entitled to certain seroffs. 
The defendant's records, sparse as they are, do show that as of 
March 26, 1984, the old debt that the defendant claims allows 
him to have a setoff have been satisfied, at least to the 
extent of a balance of $10.88 remaining to be paid from the 
plaintiff to the defendant. Accordingly, as of that date, the 
old obligation owed by the plaintiff to the defendant had 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
effectively been zeroed through various credit transactions. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, there is no legitimate 
credits after that date to which the defendant would be 
entitled. 
With respect to the defendant's claim that he never 
received any of the invoices representing the work done by the 
plaintiff, the Court finds no merit to that claim. The 
defendant's lack of records shows that he either got the 
records and has now misplaced them, or got the records and was 
not aware that they had been received. The evidence from the 
plaintiff shows that the invoices were mailed, and on many 
occasions duplicate copies were delivered, based upon the 
request of defendant's office help that they had either 
misplaced or lost the original invoice. The Court is satisfied 
that the plaintiff sent invoices on the work that had been 
accomplished. 
On the plaintiff's claim that it dealt with the defendant 
on an open account, the Court is satisfied that the elements of 
establishing an open account have not been met by the 
plaintiff. The evidence is not convincing and does not 
preponderate in favor of the plaintiff that an open account had 
been established or maintained. Accordingly, the statute of 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
limitations that would allow the recovery of invoices before 
September 30, 1985 would apply, and the plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover for those billings. 
On the issue of the time for commencing the statute of 
limitations, the Court is satisfied that it should not change 
its position as originally ruled in pretrial motions that the 
statute of limitations commences to run at the time the bilLing 
is made, and with respect to the question of delay in billing, 
the Court is satisfied that there has been a reasonable 
explanation for the delay in billing offered by the plaintiff, 
evidence which the Court finds believable, and the Ccan. is 
further satisfied that the billings were made within a 
reasonable time under the bases offered by the plaintiff for 
delay in billing. The Court finds no credible evidence that 
the billing was unduly delayed so as no prohibit collection of 
the invoices claimed to have been delayed. 
The Court: finds that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
for the amounts reflected by Exhibit 3, 12, 12, 14, 15, lb, 17, 
and 18, which total $13,424.74. 
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff retains tne 
generator which was to be sold to cne defendant, but refused. 
The defendant is entitled to the generator, assuming it is 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
still available, upon payment of the invoice, together with the 
appropriate costs and expenses allowed under the invoice. The 
plaintiff has the option, however, of selling the generator in 
a commercially reasonable manner, and retaining the proceeds 
thereof, applying those proceeds towards a credit against the 
Judgment which the Court will enter in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant in these proceedings. 
The Court declines to revisit the question regarding the 
statute of limitations as suggested by the defendant in its 
closing argument Memoranda. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare appropriate 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in 
accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Decision, and submit 
the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to the 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated thi .day of May, 1991. 
M. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC V. WILLIAMS PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following,, 
this <^^_day of May, 1991: 
Randall S. Feil 
Gregory M. Simonsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael A. Neider 
Attorney for Defendants 
5286 South 320 West, Suite A-126 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
/%L 
Exhibit 2 
Gregory M. Simonsen (A4669) 
Clark B. Fetzer (A1069) 
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7 00 Walker Center 
17 5 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 3 55-15 03 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETERSEN ELECTRIC, INC., ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS dba INDUSTRIAL ) 
COMMUNICATIONS, INDUSTRIAL ) Civil No. 890906019CV 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., and GENERAL ) 
BROADCASTING CORPORATION dba KFAM ) 
RADIO, ) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. ) 
The trial in the above-entitled case was tried to the Court, 
sitting without jury, beginning January 25, 1991 and concluding 
January 29, 1991. The plaintiff was represented by Gregory M. 
Simonsen and the defendants were represented by Michael A. Neider. 
Prior to trial, the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment determining that as a matter of law, the 
applicable point at which the statute of limitations commenced to 
run is the time that plaintiff's bills became due and payable, net 
the time that plaintiff first performed the work memorialized by 
the invoices. This issue (and others) was again briefed in trial 
briefs submitted to tire Court before trial and in written closincr 
argument. At the trial, each of the parties presented witnesses 
and the Court received written exhibits. Thereafter, counsel 
submitted closing argument in written form and the Court took the 
matter under advisement. The Court after having studied the trial 
briefs, written closing arguments, exhibits, and after having 
carefully consider the testimony of the witnesses made and entered 
its decision in the case as recorded in the Memorandum Decision of 
May 29, 1991. The Court now makes and enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation duly authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah. 
2. Defendant David Williams is a resident of the State of 
Utah, and is the owner of defendant Industrial Communications. 
Industrial Communications has its headquarters and principal place 
of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Industrial Communications incorporated in 1987, but prior 
to that time was a sole proprietorship owned by defendant David 
Williams. All business transactions between the plaintiff and 
defendants in this case were conducted prior to the time Industrial 
Communications filed its Articles of Incorporation with the 
Secretary of State cf the State of Utah, and during the time zhaz 
Industrial Communications was a sole proprietorship owned by David 
Williams. 
4. Some of the invoices are from plaintiff to defendant KFAM 
Radio. Agents of the plaintiff have testified, and the Court so 
finds that plaintiff was told by defendants1 agent that KFAM Radio 
was owned by defendant David Williams. At all time relevant 
hereto, plaintiff understood and believed that KFAM Radio was ov/ned 
by defendant David Williams as was defendant Industrial 
Communications. It was only after this litigation commenced in 
1939 that plaintiff learned of defendantsr claim that KFAM Radio 
is owned by a corporation named General Broadcasting Corporation. 
General Broadcasting Corporation is a closely held corporation 
ov/ned by defendant David Williams or David Williams and his wife. 
Defendant General Broadcasting Corporation has the same business 
address as Industrial Communications. In view of these facts, 
plaintiff reasonably believed that when it was doing business with 
KFAM Radio, it was doing business with David Williams. 
5. Work was done and materials supplied by the plaintiff for 
defendant Williams on a time and material basis and nor on a firm 
quotation or bid method. PLaintiff supplied the services and 
materials reflected in the invoices and other documents contained 
in Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, IS, 17 and IS, and has net been paid 
for these goods or services. 
6. The time charged by plaintiff and the amount charged for 
that time was reasonable and necessary zo perform the wcr>: 
requested by defendants. The work dene by plaintiff was performed 
in conformity wich ~he standards of practice for similar wcr'.: in 
this community and was done in a good and workman-like fashion. 
The hourly rate charged by the plaintiff and the cost charges 
attributable to these jobs are appropriate and in an amount which 
reflect a fair and reasonable charge for the work accomplished. 
The bills representing the work done by the plaintiff were sent to 
defendants in the mail. Duplicates were later delivered to the 
defendants based upon the request of defendants1 office help. The 
bills were not unduly delayed so as to prohibit collection by the 
plaintiff. Any delays in billing were not unreasonable and were 
satisfactorily and logically explained by the plaintiff during the 
course of trial. 
7. One of the items plaintiff delivered to the defendants 
was a new generator. Defendants' agent ordered the generator on 
behalf of the defendants and plaintiff reasonably believed that 
defendants1 agent had authority to place the order. \ Ax. the time 
the order was placed, defendants were unaware of any instructions 
from defendants to their agent not to purchase a new generator. 
Plaintiff relied upon the order placed by defendants' agent by 
purchasing the generator from plaintiff's supplier. Plaintiff had 
previous dealings with defendants' agent, in which nhe agent: had 
been authorized to purchase materials on behalf cf defendants. 
Defendants' agent had apparent authority to act on behalf of 
defendants in purchasing the generator. 
8. The defendants are net: entitled to any sat oiifs for 
services or materials provided to the plainciff. Ho services cr 
materials were provided to plaintiff by defendants after March 26, 
1984, when the balance owed by the plaintiff to defendants was 
$10-88. 
9. Each of the invoices represented in Exhibits 3, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 were billed on September 30, 1985 or after. 
The invoices did not become due and payable until the 10th of -the 
month following billing. Accordingly, the sums represented by 
Exhibits 3, 12, 13 and 14 became due and owing on October 10, 198 5 
or after; the sums represented by Exhibits 15 and 16 became due on 
November 10, 1985 or after; and the sums represented by Exhibits 
17 and 18 became due on August 10, 1986 or after. The plaintiff's 
action was filed with the Court on October 3, 1989. Hence, each 
of the invoices billed on September 30, 1985 or later is not barred 
by the applicable four year statute of limitations. 
10. Although defendants did business with plaintiff, 
defendants did not maintain an open account with plaintiff. 
Accordingly, invoices billed prior to September 30, 1985 are barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
11. With respect to the Ensign Peak job, plaintiff and 
defendants agree that the plaintiff would perform the work that was 
ultimately performed at the project site. Plaintiff provided all 
worker materials for the Ensign Peak job as set forth in Exhibit 
18 and the previous finding that all work dene by the plaintiff 
was dene in conformity with the standards of practice for sirilar 
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work in the community is also true with respect to the Ensign Peak 
job. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Although all invoices in this case were billed to either 
Industrial Communications or KFAM Radio, the debt owed is that of 
defendant David Williams, because: 
a. During the time in question Industrial 
Communications was a registered dba of David Williams. 
Industrial Communications was incorporated until 1987 after 
the invoices in this case had become due and owing; 
b. Neither David Williams or his agent:, Don Lloyd, 
disclosed the identity or existence of General Broadcasting 
Corporation. Plaintiff was told that. Industrial 
Communications and KFAM Radio were separate companies owned 
by David Williams. Defendants did not: disclose that KFAM 
Radio was in fact: owned by General Broadcasting Corporation 
which, in turn, was owned by Mr. Williams; 
c. Plaintiff reasonably believed KFAM Radio to be a 
sole proprietorship of defendant David Williams as was 
Industrial Communications. 
2. Defendant David Williams breached his obligation to pay 
plaintiff for goods and services causing plaintiff damage in tns 
amounts set forth in Exhibits 2, 12, 12, 14, 13, 15, 17, and 12, 
o 
which total $13,424.74. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
Mr. Williams for this amount. 
3. In addition to the amounts set forth in the previous 
paragraph, plaintiff is entitled to interest prior to the entry of 
judgment at the legal rate of 10% per annum, simple interest, from 
the date each of the invoices became due and owing. After the 
entry of judgment, plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum until the judgment is satisfied. 
4. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of damages or 
judgment for its invoices billed prior to September 30, 1935, 
inasmuch as those invoices are barred by the stature of limitations 
set forth in § 73-12-25 of the Utah Code, the Court having found 
that no open account existed. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to keep possession of the generator 
sold to defendants until such time as Mr. Williams pays the invoice 
together with appropriate interest owned on the invoiced amount. 
Plaintiff has the option, however, of selling the generator in a 
commercially reasonable manner and retaining the proceeds thereof, 
applying those proceeds towards a credit against the judgment to 
be entered pursuant to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
6. On the issue of the time for commencing the running of 
the statute of limitations, the Court is net persuaded by the 
further written and oral argument it has received en this matter, 
that it should change its position as originally ruled in pretrial 
motions that the statute of limitations commences to run after the 
time the billing is made. Accordingly, the Court declines to 
revisit the question regarding the statute of limitations as 
suggested by the defendants. 
7. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover it costs. 
8. Inasmuch as the judgment is against Mr. Williams, 
plaintiff's complaint as to the other defendants Industrial 
Communications, Inc. and General Broadcasting Corporation should 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
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